In this work, we extend the widely accepted security model of Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway (2000) 
Introduction
Advancements in mobile computing and other communications technologies have resulted in the increasing popularity of lightweight devices with wireless communication capabilities [1] . To fully enjoy the convenience of mobility, wireless devices travelling outside the geographical coverage of the home network should be provided with a seamless roaming service in the visited foreign network. Typically, there are three parties involved in a roaming process: a mobile user, the foreign agent, and the home agent. While security challenges in providing seamless roaming are not new, they are still a topic of current interest. More specifically, authenticated key exchange between a mobile user and a foreign agent should be achieved with the assistance of the home agent to prevent illegal usage of the network and to protect subsequent communications. The challenge of authenticated key exchange in mobile roaming systems is complicated by the need to ensure the anonymity of the mobile user is preserved. Anonymity is a property that is important not only in roaming services, but many other applications too (e.g. locationbased services, anonymous web browsing, and e-voting).
Not surprising, roaming authentication schemes are a subject of active computer science research, and examples of roaming authentication schemes for smart cards include those presented in [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Smart-card-based schemes have attracted the attention of researchers due to their potential to be widely deployed. A key security requirement for such schemes is to guarantee that only a user who is in possession of both a smart card and the corresponding password can be authenticated by their home agent; thus, 1. We formulate a security model for the analysis of SRA schemes. Our model extends the widely accepted model of Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [28] to incorporate user anonymity property and the notion of two-factor security. Note that the original Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway (BPR) model for authenticated key exchange (AKE) captures offline dictionary attacks and many other common attacks, and readers are referred to Ref. [29] to understand how a key exchange scheme that is not secure against an offline dictionary attack cannot achieve the AKE security in the BPR model. Our extension of the BPR model provides two security definitions, one for the AKE security and one for user anonymity. Both definitions capture the notion of two-factor security as they are defined considering the adversary's capability of corrupting users' smart cards. Authentication, session-key security, perfect forward secrecy, known-key security, and resistance against offline dictionary attacks by insiders/outsiders properties are implied by the AKE security.
2. We present the first SRA scheme whose AKE security as well as anonymity are formally proved in the extended model and random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Our provably-secure scheme is also computationally efficient and, as we demonstrate in this paper, is among the best performing schemes that provide both anonymity and perfect forward secrecy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes our extended model. In Section 3, we present our proposed scheme along with cryptographic primitives on which the security of our scheme relies. We conclude with a comparative efficiency and security of our scheme and other similar published schemes in Section 4.
Our Extended Security Model for SRA Schemes
Here we describe a security model extended from the BPR model [28] Partnering. Two instances are regarded as partners if they participate in a protocol execution and establish a (shared) session key, and these two instances share the same session identifier ( sid ). The latter is a unique identifier of a protocol session and usually defined as a function of the messages transmitted in the session. Let Adversary capabilities. The probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) adversary, A , is in complete control of communications between protocol participants. The adversary's capabilities are modeled using the below oracle queries, and the adversary does not need to know the true identity of a user to make oracle query to an instance of the user. We also remark that only the Execute query models passive attacks against the protocol, and the Send , Reveal , CorruptLL , CorruptSC queries model active attacks against the protocol. 
Authenticated key exchange (AKE).
The AKE security of a key exchange protocol P also depends on the notion of freshness, where a fresh instance is one that holds a session key which should not be known to A (i.e. an unfresh instance is one whose session key, or some information about the key, is revealed).
Definition 1 (Freshness). An instance i E
 is fresh unless one of the following occurs: 
Definition 4 (User anonymity).
A key exchange protocol P provides user anonymity if
ID P
Adv ( A ) is negligible for any ppt adversary A .
Our Proposed Scheme
This section presents our proposed SRA scheme.
Preliminaries
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q , and g be an arbitrary generator of G . (In practice, G could be either a multiplicative group over an ordinary finite field or an additive group on an elliptic curve, though it is written multiplicatively in this paper.) Informally stated, the CDH problem for G is to compute , where is as defined for  and  ,  is the bit-length of session keys, and  is the bit-length of MU SID (see the registration phase of our scheme below). These hash functions are modelled as random oracles in our security proofs.
Description of the Scheme
The public system parameters for our scheme include: (1) a cyclic group G of prime order q , and a generator g of group G , (2) a MAC scheme  = ( Mac , Ver ), (3) a symmetric encryption scheme  = ( Enc , Dec ), and (4) three hash functions F , H and I . These public system parameters are fixed during initialization and are known to all network participants. As part of the initialization, HA selects the master secret key 
Registration Phase
A mobile user MU registers itself with the home agent HA as follows: 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed an extension of the model of Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [28] in order to formally capture security requirements for smart-card-based roaming authentication (SRA) schemes. This allows us to formally define user anonymity and the AKE security, while capturing the notion of two-factor security. We also proved the security of our proposed SRA scheme in the extended model, which demonstrated that the scheme achieves user anonymity and AKE security. Table 1 summarizes the computational requirements and the security proofs for existing SRA schemes that provide both user anonymity and perfect forward secrecy. Although the XHBDW scheme [18] was designed to work in an additive group on an elliptic curve, we do not differentiate between modular exponentiations and scalar-point multiplications in our efficiency comparison since one can easily derive an elliptic curve version of other schemes by replacing a modular exponentiation with a scalar-point multiplication. For example, the cyclic prime-order group G used in our scheme can be replaced with an additive group on an elliptic curve as mentioned in Section 3.1. Modular exponentiation is more expensive than other operations considered in Table 1 , such as symmetric encryption/decryption, MAC generation/verification, and hash function evaluation. The total number of modular exponentiations required in XHTBY [17] is 8 while the number is reduced to 6 in the other schemes. Our scheme is comparable to the XHBDW scheme, since a MAC generation/verification is almost as fast as a hash function evaluation and a symmetric encryption/decryption is usually more expensive than a hash function evaluation (see http://www.cryptopp.com/benchmarks.html for Crypto++ benchmarks for some of the most commonly used cryptographic algorithms, such as HMAC, SHA1, DES and AES). The XHBDW scheme may be efficient, but it is proven secure in a model that captures only the AKE security and not user anonymity. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first provably-secure SRA scheme that achieves both AKE security and user anonymity.
